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To calculate the loss—is this the challenge that Nicolas Abraham has given to 
Jacques Derrida?  Between 1959 and 1975, the year of Abraham’s unexpected death, 
they were close friends, sharing what Elisabeth Roudinesco describes as “a marginal 
position in relation to the dominant philosophical discourse of the day, and an almost 
identical syntax” (599).  Yet it can hardly be said that they participated together in an 
intellectual movement in the same way that Abraham and his wife Maria Torok—and, 
latterly, Nicholas Rand—had done.  Indeed, while texts such as De la grammatologie, 
L’ecriture et la différence, and La voix et le phénomène (1967) elevated Derrida to a 
position of eminence among French theorists, Abraham’s work—of which, during his 
lifetime, only a fraction was published in essay form—was virtually unknown outside 
French psychoanalysis until the publication of Cryptonymie: Le Verbier de l’Homme 
aux Loups in 1976, the year after his death.  Interestingly, Derrida himself may have 
contributed to the marked disparity between the levels of recognition that Abraham’s 
work received before and after his death.  He refers rarely, if at all, to Abraham in his 
own work before 1975.  Then, in two interviews at the end of the same year, he refers 
directly to Abraham’s work; he writes the foreword to Cryptonymie in the following 
year; within four years he writes another essay, “Me—Psychoanalysis,” to introduce the 
English translation of Abraham’s “The Shell and the Kernel;” and, in the last two 
decades, references to the ideas of a crypt within the ego and the anasemic character of 
psychoanalytic language are made—usually, though not always, in connection with 
Abraham’s name—in La carte postale, Psyché, The Ear of the Other, Donner la mort, 
Donner le temps, and elsewhere.  What Roudinesco describes as an “identical syntax” 
might seem to us, when laid out in this way, more like a compensation or a reaction-
formation in the direction of Derrida’s own project. 
Yet nothing is gained by asking whether Derrida’s interventions contributed to 
Abraham’s belated recognition.  Since his death, immediately prior to the publication of 
his most famous account of failed mourning, it has been almost impossible for the 
responses to Abraham’s work to divorce the theory of the crypt from his name—and, 
therefore, from the life for which this name purports to have signed.  Remarkably, of the 
many occasions on which Derrida refers to Abraham and his work, after his death, there 
are—to the best of my recollection—none which refer directly to this death.  As Peggy 
Kamuf noted soon after the publication of Abraham and Torok’s collection of essays in 
1978 (L’ecorce et le noyau), Derrida’s foreword to Cryptonymie bears down so heavily 
upon the term which Abraham and Torok take as the title of this work, and upon the 
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names of the analysts, that his words “cut through to the stone so that we can read them 
as epitaph” (33).  “Writing on Abraham’s crypt,” Derrida thus casts himself in the role 
of Abraham’s “eulogist” (34).  The role of the eulogist is, of course, not to refer directly 
to the death, but to give praise and recall the life.  Like the eulogia from which the 
eulogy takes its name—the bread of the Eucharist that is distributed among those who 
do not participate in communion—it keeps the body of the dead alive.  The “fantasy of 
incorporation,” as Abraham and Torok described it, is just such a refusal to mourn; a 
refusal by the ego, that is, to introject loss: 
Incorporation is the refusal to reclaim as our own the part of ourselves that 
we placed in what we lost; incorporation is the refusal to acknowledge the 
full import of the loss, a loss that, if recognized as such, would effectively 
transform us. (Shell 127) 
Incorporation produces the gap in the psyche which Abraham and Torok have called the 
crypt, a place where the lost object is to be kept alive within the ego.  We gain nothing, 
then, by asking if Derrida contributes to Abraham’s recognition precisely because his 
interventions have performed the fantasy of incorporation as Abraham had described it 
in his own work. 
To rephrase the question with which we are concerned here, is it possible under 
the spell of an incorporation to calculate loss?  We have already seen that the question is 
complicated in the first instance by having as the particular object of loss the person 
who gave us the terms in which we have attempted to frame the question.  As Kamuf 
asks, “was Abraham’s text dictated already from that ‘beyond-the-Self’ and beyond a 
grave, the unspecified circumstance which is finally his own death?  What has Nicolas 
Abraham left us in his will?” (38).  What Abraham has left us—the gift of his death—is, 
in short, loss.  To incorporate “Abraham,” along with the work which carries this name 
as a signature, is to incorporate the theory of incorporation and expose the incorporation 
as a fantasy.  Yet we recall that incorporation is, in Abraham’s words, a “refusal to 
reclaim as our own the part of ourselves that we placed in what we lost”—it is, in other 
words, a denial of the fundamental relation of the Self to the other.  With the fantasy of 
incorporation exposed to the ego as a fantasy, it should dissolve, were it not that the ego 
believing itself to be replenished by incorporation would then have to recognise its own 
fundamental emptiness in the face of the other.  The ego confronts a simple enough 
choice: loss of the (indispensable) other or loss of the Self.  As Derrida notes in his 
foreword to Cryptonymie, the crypt is a “monument” to this impossible choice between 
two “catastrophes,” since it is erected upon the contradiction that has forced the ego into 
this choice yet it continually holds the choice over for deferral: 
it remains that the otherness of the other installs within any process of 
appropriation (even before any opposition between introjecting and 
incorporating) a “contradiction,” or ... an undecidable irresolution that 
forever prevents the two from closing over their rightful, ideal, proper 
coherence, in other words and at any rate, over their death. (xxii)2
                                                          
2 All references to Cryptonymie are from the English translation, The Wolf Man’s Magic Word, by 
Nicholas Rand.  Where I refer to Cryptonymie by the French title, I will be discussing the original text 
although I cite the translation here for convenience.  Where I later refer to The Wolf Man’s Magic Word 
by its English title, I will be discussing Rand’s preface to the translation, which does not of course appear 
in the original. 
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We note here that when Derrida translates Abraham’s theory of the crypt, the relation to 
the object of loss is grounded in a notion of property.  He states the case concisely in 
Given Time, when he refers to his own comments on Cryptonymie: “Here again, it is a 
matter of the limits of a problematic of appropriation—and the question of the gift will 
never be separated from that of mourning” (n.13, 129).  Similarly, in Aporias, he lists 
the impossible work of mourning—the impossible choice between incorporation and 
introjection—as he explains it in the foreword to Cryptonymie, and the question of the 
“gift as the impossible” as it is raised in Given Time, among the aporetic non-concepts 
which put to the test the “passage” and the “partitioning” (partage) between opposite 
sides of a border or limit, in such a way that the multiple figure of the aporia “installs 
the haunting of the one in the other” (15-20).  
Later, in The Gift of Death, Derrida will fold the question of this haunting over 
onto the question of the responsibility it implies.  The “gift” and “mourning” may be of 
a kind—both impossible, aporetic, vaulting over two sides of a border, and so on—but 
the “gift of death,” or the “act of giving death” when understood as sacrifice (as in the 
sacrifice demanded by God of Abraham) can suspend “both the work of negation and 
work itself, perhaps even the work of mourning” (65).  For Derrida, the key ideas here 
are “secrecy and exclusivity [non-partage]” (73).  Abraham is no tragic hero, for tragic 
heroes can bemoan their lot.  Instead, Abraham’s silence, that is, his inability to speak 
of his duty is the true measure of this duty, his “singular relation with the unique God” 
(74).  In making this observation, Derrida interrogates Søren Kierkegaard’s claim that 
“ethical exigency is regulated by generality” (60). 
Yet what interests me most here is the way in which Derrida approaches the  “gift 
of death” as a (non-)concept.  While the impossibility of the gift and death (in the work 
of mourning) are spelled out elsewhere in advance, they are brought together here in 
such a way that the boundary between these two non-concepts is subjected to scrutiny: 
aporia of aporias.  This “boundary” is of course merely a mark of contingency, or of 
having to impose the limit to what one can write about anything within any single 
moment of writing.  Yet here, in The Gift of Death, this boundary is problematised not 
only by what Derrida writes about the singularity of the ethical relation in each and 
every case—“Every other (one) is every (bit) other [tout autre est tout autre], every one 
else is completely or wholly other” (68)—but also by this writing itself.  David Wills 
notes in the translator’s preface to The Gift of Death that this text is not “intended, as it 
might seem, to be the second volume of Given Time; it is instead a different reflection 
within a series on the question of the gift” (vii).  Shall we assume for a moment that the 
translator can ever know what is “intended” of a text—although we shall return to this 
question soon enough—then we must be struck by the assertion that this text is not, “as 
it might seem,” a continuation of Given Time.  If this text is altogether “different,” then 
the interrogation of the “gift” and “mourning” through the “gift of death” must therefore 
“seem” more like an appropriation than a continuation, or else (or also) the aporias of 
the gift and of mourning may be thought to “haunt” this later text.   
In translating Abraham’s theory of the crypt, Derrida had already confronted just 
such a “haunting” across the limits of appropriation, as this problematic is itself one of 
the things he appropriates.  When he performs the formation of the crypt by keeping the 
body of Abraham alive, at least in the figure of the “corpus” of his written work, he 
raises the question of the gift not only as it applies generally to the ego’s refusal to 
reclaim that part of itself that was invested in the lost object, but also in the specific 
sense that his performance appropriates this very corpus.  Since it is a function of such 
appropriation that an undecidable irresolution prevents the closure of either introjection 
and/or incorporation over death, Derrida’s performance might also be seen as a deferral 
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of that death through a calculation of the loss in advance.  Here I am thinking not only 
of the numerous references to Abraham’s work after his death, but also of the calculated 
mourning and the work of translation performed in the last major work completed by 
Derrida before Abraham’s death: Glas (1974).  In this paper, I shall identify fragments 
of an appropriation which underline—or undermine—the calculations in Glas, as they 
hide themselves within these very terms, “calculation,” “glas,” and others.  Although I 
will not go so far as to say that these calculations anticipate Abraham’s death, we shall 
see that they establish a particular relation to his theories of translation and mourning: a 
relation that carries across the threshold or limit of his death in such a way that in 
Derrida’s subsequent performance, even as recently as The Gift of Death, the loss that 
this performance is calculated to incorporate is obscured by a loss that has already 
insinuated itself into the structure of calculation. 
The crossing of this threshold leaves its mark in the two interviews that Derrida 
gave at the end of 1975, which are reproduced in Points as “Between Brackets I” and 
“Ja, or the faux-bond II.”  While these interviews deal in the most part with Glas, it is 
also possible, I suggest, to read them as eulogia to Derrida’s recently deceased friend, in 
anticipation of the foreword to Cryptonymie.  In them we find Derrida articulating the 
ways in which the mourning-work in Glas has not only been a work on mourning, as the 
“practical, effective analysis of mourning,” but has also been worked upon by mourning 
(48).  Then, in a noticeable change of tense, he shifts into the present with the following 
passage which seems to refer to something other than this Glas that has already been 
completed and whose calculations have been done with: 
Without them, beyond the philosophemes and post-philosophemes (so 
refined, polished, recombined, infinitely crafty) that treat all the states 
(which have worked themselves into a great state) of death, nothingness, 
denegation, idealization, interiorization, and so forth (I am thinking here of 
a place and a moment of my self in which I know them too well, in which 
they know me too well), I am trying to experience in my body an altogether 
other relation to the unbelievable “thing which is not.” (48-9) 
From having-been worked upon by mourning to experiencing in the present (in one’s 
presence) another relation to the “thing which is not” (the absent remainder of death), 
Derrida shifts into a mode of non-response to the milieu of the interview that he calls 
“improvisation” (49).  However much the finite machinery of the interview may limit or 
reign in the impromptu, the same machines “always end up forming a place that is 
exposed, vulnerable, and invisible to whoever tries out all the clever ruses” (49).  He 
describes the way in which the interviewee cannot help but “betray his defenses” by 
allowing himself to be “restricted by the situation” into an appropriate selection from 
the mass of possible discourses (50).  In this way, Derrida betrays his defenses, and it is 
by the end of the paragraph describing how “the speaker defends, confesses, betrays 
himself only by exposing his system of defense” that he also exposes a part of himself 
in a passage that in the context of the current discussion may sound rather like regret: 
“whoever decided that all of this deserved to be published or that anything deserved to 
be published, or rather that between a secret and its publication there has ever been any 
possibility of a code or a common rate in this place?” (51)  Immediately he does this, 
however, Derrida snaps his defenses back: “How did we get here?  Ah, yes, the 
mourning for mourning, to the point of exhaustion” (51).  This “ah, yes” is nothing, of 
course, like the “vast and boundless yes” that is cited at the end of Glas, and to which he 
turns in the interview at this moment, and yet it has everything to do with the ends or 
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the limits of Glas.  In that this “ah, yes” is not the movement of a response or of a 
responsibility to an other, or insofar as it diverts the trajectory of a discourse that may 
have revealed the trace of the secret that is concealed by one’s defenses, this “ah, yes” 
amounts instead to a calculation. 
Yet Derrida has already alerted us to the limits of calculation when he describes 
the “principal themes” of Glas in terms that sound remarkably like those in which—in 
the foreword to Cryptonymie—he would describe the problematic of appropriation:  
reception (assimilation, digestion, absorption, introjection, incorporation), or 
non-reception (exclusion, foreclosure, rejection, and once again, but this 
time as internal expulsion, incorporation), thus the theme of internal or 
external vomiting, of mourning-work and everything that gets around to or 
comes down to throwing up.  But Glas does not only treat these themes; in a 
certain way, it offers itself up to all these operations. (41-2) 
In order to offer itself up to these operations, however, Glas will have been calculated to 
fail in its calculations or to offer itself up as non-receivable or unreadable; which is 
another way of saying that it will have been necessary for it to take in the other, since 
the possible modes of readership, or the possible “reading effects,” must be factored 
into the calculations of a text that seeks to become inaccessible to them.  In order for the 
reading of Glas to be “taken in” (duped), in other words, it must have been “taken in” 
(incorporated) by the text, in advance: 
The neither-swallowed-nor-rejected, that which remains stuck in the throat 
as other, neither-received-nor-expulsed (the two finally coming down to the 
same thing); that is perhaps the desire of what has been (more or less) 
calculated in Glas.  Naturally, the important thing (for me in any case) is not 
to succeed with this calculation. (43) 
The other of Glas is in every sense of the word beyond its calculations, which is why 
these calculations manifest desire—always the fantastic wish to include what they can 
never include.  Since his language here anticipates the foreword to Cryptonymie, there 
can be no doubt that Derrida has Abraham and Torok’s work on his mind throughout 
the interview.  Yet we might also suppose that his description of Glas in terms that are 
to be articulated in more detail in Cryptonymie is not entirely a reworking of an earlier 
text in terms of a later one.  We know that Abraham and Torok had been working on 
their book for about five years—the introduction to Cryptonymie gives us this figure as 
its first words (lxx)—so what Derrida may be hinting at here is that his calculations in 
Glas also include (or at least desire) the theory of the crypt. 
Yet the “important thing (for me in any case),” as Derrida admits, is that these 
calculations do not succeed, or rather, as he adds, “the calculation only succeeds in/by 
failing” (43).  We are brought here to the edge of a precipice, when confronted with a 
calculation attempting to be unreadable by incorporating its possible reading-effects, yet 
which also includes a crypt—the very condition of unreadability—among its possible 
reading-effects.  However, the theory of the crypt, including what Nicholas Rand in his 
translator’s introduction to The Wolf Man’s Magic Word calls the method for making 
“the unreadable readable,” guarantees that the crypt will not close out reading altogether 
(lx).  Importantly, at around the time that Derrida hints at the importance for Glas of the 
theory of the crypt, he is also preparing to write in the foreword to Cryptonymie that 
this theory and the method that it names can be found operating under different names 
in Abraham’s work from as early as 1961.  The “hieroglyphic model,” as he calls it, is 
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at work “everywhere (it is often evoked in The Magic Word),” but it is something more, 
and something other, than an “analogical” model, since the text to be deciphered, even 
as a “proper” name or body, is treated as something that is “not essentially verbal or 
phonetic” (xxix).  Out of Abraham’s earlier work on translation, and from his early 
work on the “broken symbol,” Derrida extracts the lineaments of a model that is already 
equipped to receive the crypt as a harbinger of words as “word-things.”  The desire of 
Glas to include the theory of the crypt is thus also a desire to incorporate this theory—
and the body of concepts through which Abraham arrives at this theory—in the form of 
“word-things.”3
From the beginning of the interviews that he gives in 1975, Derrida provides an 
example of a word that Glas omits even as it seems to have been necessary.  The word 
is “crampon” (hook), which refers to what Imre Hermann calls the “clinging instinct” 
(cramponnement) and specifically to what Abraham, in his introduction to L’instinct 
filial, calls “de-clinging” (dé-cramponnement), the initial traumatic separation (6).  In 
Glas, as Derrida points out, the word should have been impossible to ignore when, in an 
insert to the Genet column, he brings everything “down to living in the hook of the 
cripple; the cluster, the grapnel are a kind of hooked matrix” (Glas 216bi).4  The hook 
in the original is given throughout as “crochet,” even when Derrida lists the numerous 
grap- or crap- words which tie the word “hook” to the concept of clustering.  He notes 
in the interview that the “crampon” should have imposed itself in Glas on everything 
that ties or holds together—on the relation “between the two columns or colossi,” for 
example—or on every reference to the fleece, since a key component of de-clinging is 
the reluctant release from one’s grip on the bodily hair of the mother, or especially, he 
adds, “in the passage from gl, to gr, and to cr that moves all throughout the last pages 
and the last scenes, and so on” (7-8).  Yet he also freely admits in the interview that in 
writing Glas, he will have been unable to extricate the written text from the embraces, 
the brackets or parentheses, or what Abraham calls “parenthemes,” of the mother that it 
clings to with its written hooks—its emphatic marks and punctuations (9).  Gregory 
Ulmer takes up this point in “Sounding the Unconscious,” suggesting that Glas may be 
“read as an anasemic scene performing certain aspects of, and relationships to, the drive 
of research as clinging to or detachment from the mother” (99).  What Ulmer adds to 
Derrida’s improvised reflections on the relation of Glas to the mother is that by 
Abraham’s reckoning the drive of research is chief among the substitutive acts by which 
the mature individual carries on the desire for the mother, “a quest for an object that is 
not proper to him” (qtd. 99).  His point is of course that a theory of the clinging instinct, 
a theory of the crampon, is arrived at by just such an educative activity, in the search for 
that which cannot be grasped: the unconscious. 
Abraham calls “anasemic” those words or concepts which direct us away from 
what they would usually mean, pointing us instead toward the source of meaning, the 
formation of the unconscious, and so on.  Such words, like the crampon in this case, 
thus refer to themselves not in the sense of a one-to-one correspondence with a here-
and-now—Derrida spends much of the first interview in 1975 problematising the idea 
                                                          
3 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has read Glas on the model of the crypt’s “counter-fiction: to analyse the 
cryptonym, to spell the author’s signature.  The debris of d-words is scattered all over the pages” (24).  In 
“Glas-Piece: A Compte Rendu,” Spivak reads Glas as a site not unlike the crypt within the ego, in which 
Derrida’s name is held and is repeatedly writing itself as a thing.  Yet she notes that this rewriting of the 
name expresses a desire: “his own autobiographical desire”—to write one’s own name everywhere in the 
folds of the text and not just on its surface (24).   
4 Page numbers from Glas follow the system employed by John P. Leavey, Jr., in Glassary, whereby the 
letter or letters after each page number indicate the column from which each quotation is taken (a or b), 
and whether the source is included in Glas as an insert (i). 
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of a “here-and-now”—but, in a sense, in no sense at all, or, as Ulmer states the matter, 
in “a certain pre-sense, as opposed to the focus of phenomenology on presence” (99).  
What these words describe, then, is the degree to which the source of meaning treats 
words more like things than words in their relation to the unconscious.  Importantly, in 
his “Introduction to Hermann,” Abraham uses a term to describe the pre-originary status 
of the relation of such words to meaning that resonates sharply with echoes of the 
Derridean arche-trace: he calls them “arche-models” (qtd. 99).  In Hermann’s use of the 
crampon, Abraham finds the exemplary arche-model, as it is a concept that underwrites 
all other anasemic-psychoanalytic terms—it is, as Derrida has stated the case, “archi-
psychoanalytic.”  Yet in Glas, as Derrida confesses in the interview, this arche-model 
has been subjected to the process it describes—substitutive clinging—in such a way that 
the word itself becomes the word-thing that will not be made a word.  The crampon, this 
arche-model, in its absence from Glas, remains as what Abraham and Torok call an 
“archeonym” in their own introduction to Cryptonymie (lxxi). 
The cat, then, would seem to have been let out of the bag: the Glas-secret would 
appear to have been revealed.  Has it?  I want to consider at the last here that even the 
crampon functions in the mode of the defensive “ah, yes” that I discussed earlier, and 
that what Derrida says when this defense is momentarily eased will merely hint at an 
entirely other unspeakable word that has been glossed over by Glas.  The cat, indeed, is 
still very much something to which Derrida clings.  Gayatri Spivak notes in “Glas-
Piece: A Compte Rendu” that the Genet column allows itself to be “dis-integrated” by 
virtue of the “sleight of hand” with which it connects its numerous fragments, and we 
observe that among the first of its “monstrations” is the chain of words beginning with 
“cata”: Catachresis, catafalque, cataglottism. 
They seem linked, but the accompanying lexical entries show that they are 
not really.  Cata- in the first is “against,” in the second “cat” (name of a war-
machine by catachresis) or “to see,” in the third “research.”  . . .  Here the 
very language is kept catachrestic, and this chain of words might be its 
signal.  Indeed Derrida quotes the dictionary entry that points out that the 
French name of language—langue or tongue—is a catachresis. (39) 
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This “cata” is what is known in linguistic parlance as a bound morpheme, since it can 
not stand free floatingly as a word.  Such binding is of course one of the Glas-themes 
which leads us to assume that the text clings to the idea of clinging.  Yet we also note 
that the cat which clings in the form of a bound morpheme does not become so bound 
without introducing into the word it forms a deceptive uncertainty with regard to what 
Abraham and Torok call the word’s “allosemes” (Cryptonymie passim).   We must not 
forget however that this deception is staged for us by Glas, floating the “cata” free as a 
word-thing that opens out a gap within binding, or that performs for our benefit the de-
clinging at the source of the meanings of words.  When Derrida reflects upon Glas in 
the interview and observes the necessary absence of the word-thing crampon from its 
pages, he does so in the knowledge that the calculation of a certain de-clinging has been 
performed within the uncertainty of Glas from the outset.  This crampon, then, is a 
calculation that Derrida adds in the interview to the possible reading-effects that will 
have been already included in the calculations made in Glas.  We will not be surprised 
to see that at a point in the interview when his defenses have been momentarily eased, 
Derrida recovers himself and his calculations with the following: “Where were we? Oh 
yes, the cramp” (24). 
So what has he said that requires a recovery from him in the interview?  We are 
probably no longer surprised to find that at this point, Derrida has sidetracked himself 
with what Abraham has said about “mourning as concerns the loss of clinging” (24).  
De-clinging lends itself to anxiety precisely because of the “whirlpool-like character” 
that belongs to the instincts, since their effects are constitutive of the topical structure 
that is also threatened by their desiring drive.   He notes that this push-me-pull-you is 
what Abraham terms the “doubly cited movement” of anxiety in Hermann’s theory (qtd. 
24).  Derrida’s anxiety becomes apparent as he is drawn into the whirlpool-like contours 
of a text which cites one text in order to cite another—he performs, in this sense, his 
own doubly cited movement: 
But, once again, read Nicolas Abraham’s “glossary.”  This is how it ends: 
“‘Oh!  But that is something I’ve always known . . . How could I have 
forgotten it?’  If we have our way, this is what the reader will now refer to 
with a single word: to hermannize.” (24) 
The next words we read from Derrida are the calculated recovery: “Where were we?”   
I want to focus here upon a word to which Derrida resorts as he feels himself 
drawn into this doubly cited movement of anxiety: he refers to Abraham’s “Introduction 
to Hermann” for the only time that I am aware of, anywhere in all of his writings, with 
Abraham’s own word for his mode of reading Hermann, as a “glossary.”  Using this 
cue, I want also to consider another glossary, written by Abraham between 1950 and 
1951.  This glossary, A Glossary of Paradigmatics, was written, though not finished, 
while he was still very much under the sway of Husserl, and the project was obviously 
abandoned as he began to be more interested with psychoanalysis and the sources of 
meaning overlooked by the phenomenological attitude.  It is thanks to Torok and Rand, 
who have written an essay on this Glossary as a postscript to Abraham’s early essays on 
poetry published in Rhythms: On the Work, Translation, and Psychoanalysis, that we 
know that of the existence of this unfinished work.  Importantly, they also claim that 
Abraham “had no intention of having the Glossary published without an accompanying 
text to breathe life into its terms” (134).  Again, we confront this question of whether a 
translator (or an editor for that matter) can know “intention,” a question that returns 
with particular force, as we shall see, because the structure of translation is precisely 
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what the Glossary analyses.  Before exploring this question more closely, I want to 
consider that Derrida could have known of this unpublished document, given his close 
friendship with Abraham over a substantial period of time. 
Recall now the two moments in the interviews in 1975 when, as I have pointed 
out, Derrida’s defenses are eased and his anxieties exposed.  There was a momentary 
concern over who decides that anything deserves to be published, or “that between a 
secret and its publication there has ever been any possibility of a code or a common rate 
in this place?” (51); and there was this perhaps unintentional dropping of a name of an 
unfinished, unpublished document, apparently intended by its author to remain a secret.  
As we have seen, Derrida would later record in The Gift of Death that secrecy, as in 
“Abraham’s silence” is essential in understanding the ethical singularity of responsible 
relations.  Of course, this Abraham can not be mistaken for the author of the Glossary, 
but it should also not be mistaken for the father of Isaac.  After all, this Abraham is a far 
different character than the father castrator who is the subject of the Hegel column from 
pages 40 to 45 in Glas.  The difference between the Abraham discussed in Glas and the 
Abraham discussed in The Gift of Death may be identified as the difference between 
Hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s Abrahams: the former is the castrating primal founder of a 
people; the latter is a pathetic figure incapable of making himself understood.  Yet we 
should not lose sight of the degree to which this difference is measurable here because 
the two are presented to us by Derrida in texts that I identify as crucial markers in his 
relationship with a friend whose name is also Abraham.  Given this context, when we 
hear Derrida discuss Abraham’s silence, are we not struck by what must seem a rueful 
gesture: to be able to continue to speak, to write, to publish, or more precisely, to be 
able to speak of his friend’s secrecy, and just perhaps . . . to publish his secret. 
Thus, we arrive at my key point: Derrida’s anxiety in these interviews in 1975, 
soon after the death of his good friend, centres not on whether he has been in any way 
complicit in his friend’s relative anonymity, but that he feels that somehow he may have 
told the world more than he should have?  We know of course that the existence of the 
Glossary would remain a secret until the publication of Rhythms by Rand and Torok in 
1985.  Surely, ten years earlier, Derrida had no cause for concern.  Yet his subsequent 
meditations on the gift of death seem now to suggest to us that the issue of Abraham’s 
secret is crucial in understanding Derrida’s own singular relation with his deceased 
friend.  As I have argued elsewhere, much of the rest of The Gift of Death uses the 
discussion of the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka, in part, as a refusal to mourn for 
another recently departed friend, Emmanuel Levinas.5  Yet I also note that the third 
section, entitled “Whom To Give To,” is something of the odd chapter out, since it 
suspends the discussion of Patočka’s work to focus on Kierkegaard’s Abraham.  My 
point is that Derrida will momentarily suspend his refusal to mourn Levinas in order to 
re-assert an ongoing performance of incorporation (a prior refusal to mourn), but the 
temptation to combine the two is forcefully resisted, by imposing the limit of chapter 
breaks between them: the singularity of each relation is maintained.  
Now, let us turn our attention for a moment to what Torok and Rand let on about 
the Glossary.  We are told that the project was intended to provide “an analysis of the 
various structures of translation as well as a new technique of translation” (134).  This 
analysis identified the work to be translated as “paradigmatic” and the work that turns 
toward this other work as “paradeictic,” though, as Torok and Rand point out, both of 
these works could be described as paradeictic since even the supposedly paradigmatic 
work was turned toward another work within translation, a chimeric other work or an 
ideal model (136).  This ideal model may well be read as the prototype for what was to 
                                                          
5 “R.S.V.P.,” forthcoming in Paragraph (July, 2000). 
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become the “arche-model” or “anasemia” of Abraham’s later work, and might thus be 
described as the arche-model of the theory of the arche-model, the arche-model par 
excellence.  Little wonder, then, that in the closing sections of Cryptonymie, Abraham 
quips, “We have basically always done paradigmatics” (qtd. 135).  There is nothing in 
this that should be a cause of Derrida’s anxiety, since he seems to have gone out of his 
way in the interviews to avoid direct reference to the term “arche-model,” and even 
when he later draws connections between Abraham’s last projects and earlier material, 
this chronology is traced back no further than 1961.  Yet let us look closely at what 
Torok and Rand call the “centrepiece” of the Glossary, its entry on the ideal model of 
translation, which Abraham calls calque: 
An essentially alloglottic paradeictic work displaying references to all the 
elements of a complete model.  Calque presupposes a reflexive experience 
of the original poetic universe.  In principle, it accomplishes the isotopia and 
homeo-syntopia of all poetic levels while producing the equivalent of all the 
horizontal and vertical elements. (qtd. 143) 
Symptomatic of its phenomenological attitude, this arche-model of arche-models is, it is 
true, directed toward an original universe rather than a pre-originary one, yet as the 
condition for the possibility of what has traditionally been conceived in poetics as the 
original of a translation, calque creates the initial movement toward the pre-originary 
that characterises Abraham’s later work. 
Reading the centrepiece, though, are we not struck immediately by what Derrida 
would call its glas-effects, and by the degree to which it voices so many concerns that 
Glas thematises or takes as its object?  Isolating the inserts in the Genet column from 
pages 149 to 160 would be enough to demonstrate Derrida’s suspicion of translations 
that are deaf to the “+L effect (consonant +L),” to the extent that what he looks for in a 
translation is not only the carry-over of the form of words from one text to another, but 
also the remains of this division.  As the entry calque suggests, such a remainder is 
inscribed in the process of translation itself, as the a priori of the division, and that what 
translation does is leave the trace of this a priori in the separation of the original from its 
copy.  The word calque is French for a tracing, though it is inflected here in a way that 
would suggest an anasemic dimension, pointing instead toward the source of the 
tracing.  In Glas, of course, the word is never used, but the other French word for a 
tracing—tracé—appears as the homonym for the verb “to trace” (tracer), indicating, like 
Abraham’s calque, both the tracing itself and its source within a single word and its 
allosemes (68b, 79b).  Furthermore, the word tracé is the object of one of the text’s key 
calculations, when it is inverted to form the deviation or gap (écart) whose traces (trace 
d’écart) are left as a remainder of the glas-effect (passim). 
Yet this calque is not only thematised by Glas as an absent term whose presence is 
hinted at in the same way as the crampon.  The term itself has, I suggest, been very 
carefully included within Derrida’s calculations—indeed, we hear its echo within the 
word “calculation” itself, in calcul, and in calculer.  If we return to the opening pages 
for a moment, to the clinging and de-clinging “cata-,” we note carefully what Derrida 
points out to us from these passages: not that the cat is itself errant—he will return to 
that point later—but that the “ALCs sound, clack, explode, reflect, and (re)turn them-
selves in every sense and direction, count and discount themselves” and so on (2bi).  I 
emphasise now something that he states in the interview in 1975 as an aside, between 
brackets as it were: “and since you ask me about Glas, I put in brackets the fact that 
“claque,” the word and the thing, as one says, is one of the objects of the book” (40).  If 
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this object of Glas, the “claque,” reflects and (re)turns itself in every direction, we see 
not only the movement from the ALC to the CLA of the clack—and, indeed, of the 
“clamor” whose German form Klammer is one of the forms of the crampon—but also 
the (re)turn to the ALC of the calque.  Taking this another step further, we can see the 
many turns and soundings of the glas-effect: “class” is a key word in the sounding of 
glas; and ça (“it/id,” “savoir absolu,” and just about everything to which Glas “comes 
down”) especially with the “hook” turned, as Derrida suggests in 1975, is the CA; to 
this we can add that “Glas” thus sounds the (re)turn of the “calque.”  
Derrida’s anxiety in the interviews in 1975 may well be attributable, then, to his 
knowledge that with the publication of Glas a part of Abraham’s secret Glossary had 
also been published (albeit cryptically) not long before his death.  After this death, in 
1975, Derrida will have been acutely aware that Abraham’s legacy and his will may 
already have been compromised.  Of course, the question of his will has already been 
traversed by the issue of “intention” which Abraham’s own unpublished, untranslated 
material interrogates.  This may well be the reason why Derrida so abruptly raises the 
question in 1975 of who gets to decide, “between a secret and its publication,” what 
code is to be brought into play.  In his own singular relation with Abraham, a specific 
responsibility inheres, which cannot be reduced to the simple question of what a dead 
author intended.  We must remember that, for Derrida at least, Abraham’s death is not, 
in the end, really about his “death,” even (or, especially) when this death is inseparable 
from his name and the works that it signs.  Derrida has always been certain that one of 
the things that remains most uncertain is our relation to death, since the question of this 
relation is a limit that attempts to close over the threshold.  This is stated in Aporias: 
“The relevance of the question of knowing whether it is from one’s own proper death or 
from the other’s death that the relation to death or the certitude of death is instituted is 
limited from the start” (61).  The loss that Abraham asks Derrida to calculate is not to 
do with his death, but is a loss in the body of his work that Abraham seemed to want to 
impose upon this corpus.  In the end—or, rather, vaulting across the threshold of this 
end—Derrida’s calculations in Glas, as in the glas-effects of calculation as such, already 
incorporate this loss insofar as they have incorporated the whole of the body of work 
which contains the secret of its pre-origins (its incomplete arche-model: the Glossary 
and its centrepiece, calque).  In the end, all later calculations, and the calculation of loss, 
answer to these glas-effects. 
 
Works Cited 
  
Abraham, Nicolas and Maria Torok. The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of 
Psychoanalysis. Trans. Nicholas T. Rand. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1994. 
---. The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonymy. Trans. Nicholas Rand. Minneapolis: 
U of Minnesota P, 1986. 
Derrida, Jacques. Aporias. Trans. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1993.  
---. “Foreword: Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok.” Trans. 
Barbara Johnson. The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonymy. Nicolas 
Abraham and Maria Torok. Trans. Nicholas Rand. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota 
P, 1986. xi-xlviii. 
---. The Gift of Death. Trans. David Wills. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995. 
---. Glas. Trans. John P. Leavey, jr., and Richard Rand. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1986. 
---. “Me-Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to the Translation of ‘The Shell and the 
Kernel’ by Nicolas Abraham.” Trans. Richard Klein. Diacritics 9.1 (1979): 4-12. 
 12
---. Points... Interviews, 1974-1994. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Ed. Elisabeth Weber. 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995. 
Kamuf, Peggy. “Abraham’s Wake.” Diacritics 9.1 (1979): 32-43. 
Leavey, John P., jr. Glassary. Lincoln, U of Nebraska P, 1986. 
Roudinesco, Elisabeth. Jacques Lacan & Co. A History of Psychoanalysis in France, 
1925-1985. Trans. Jeffrey Mehlman. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Glas-Piece: A Compte Rendu.” Diacritics 7.3 (1977): 
22-43.  
Torok, Maria and Nicholas T. Rand. “Paradeictic: Translation, Psychoanalysis, and the 
Work of Art in the Writings of Nicolas Abraham.” Rhythms: On the Work, 
Translation, and Psychoanalysis. Nicolas Abraham. Trans. Benjamin Thigpen and 
Nicholas T. Rand. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995. 
Ulmer, Gregory L. “Sounding the Unconscious.” Glassary. John P. Leavey jr. Lincoln: 
U of Nebraska P, 1986. 23-129. 
 
